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Judgment / October 5, 2026 / 6 min read

Congressional Term Limits Are a Trap—Limit Power, Not Just Time in Office

Let me start where the term-limit crowd and I agree. The anger behind the movement is justified. Americans look at Washington and see a permanent political...

Let me start where the term-limit crowd and I agree. The anger behind the movement is justified. Americans look at Washington and see a permanent political class that exempts itself from the rules it writes for everyone else. House incumbents who seek reelection win at rates that routinely exceed ninety percent in most cycles. That is not a sign of a healthy republic. That is a sign of an entrenched ruling class.

So the instinct to throw the bums out is healthy. The policy conclusion, however, is a trap. If we limit time in office without first limiting power in office, we will not restore the republic. We will simply rotate the rulers and hand even more authority to unelected staffers, lobbyists, and bureaucrats. The real term limit is not a clock. It is the Constitution's enumeration of powers.

The founders chose rotation, not term limits

Here is a fact the modern term-limit movement rarely mentions. The Articles of Confederation actually had a term limit. No delegate could serve more than three years in any six-year period. The Constitution of 1787 deliberately dropped that restriction.

That was not an oversight. The Founders understood that in a republic, the people's protection comes not from arbitrary disqualification but from frequent elections and a common interest between the representative and the represented. James Madison put the principle plainly in Federalist 57. He wrote that the aim of every political constitution is first to obtain rulers who possess wisdom to discern and virtue to pursue the common good, and then to take the most effectual precautions for keeping them virtuous while they hold their public trust. The elective mode, Madison argued, is the characteristic policy of republican government. That was not a loophole. It was a design feature.

At the founding, Congress was a citizen legislature. Members had farms, law practices, and businesses to return to. Rotation happened naturally because the job did not carry a massive salary, an army of staff, a pension, and power over nearly every corner of American life. The Founders did not need term limits because the federal government was small enough that public office was not a career worth capturing.

Today the situation is reversed. The federal government now touches health care, education, energy, finance, technology, and the daily decisions of millions of ordinary people. The pot of power is enormous. So of course ambitious people want to stay. But changing the length of time they may stay does not shrink the pot. It only changes who gets to eat from it.

Why term limits shift power to the unelected

Here is what most term-limit supporters miss. Because Congress now presides over so much of American life, no single legislator can master the machinery. That is the knowledge problem Friedrich Hayek described. The relevant information about a society is dispersed across millions of people, and no central actor can gather it all. When you impose term limits on top of that reality, the knowledge does not disappear. It migrates.

Veteran lawmakers leave. Their staffs remain. Lobbyists remain. Agency officials remain. The permanent bureaucracy remains.

A freshman congressman with six years to make a mark will not suddenly become a tribune of liberty. He will arrive, hire staff, and defer to the permanent machinery. He will depend on leadership, consultants, and the agencies. The twenty-year committee staffer who has written every amendment will become the real lawmaker. The lobbyist who has worked the same committee for a decade will become the real drafter. The agency head who never faces a voter will become the real regulator.

The practical effect of term limits is not to weaken Washington. It is to shift power away from the people's elected representatives and toward the administrative state. That is the opposite of what conservatives and libertarians should want.

Term limits would also strengthen the executive branch. A Congress full of short-timers is a Congress less able to check the president or the bureaucracy. Members would have less institutional knowledge, less seniority, and less incentive to fight a long battle. The executive branch, which does not face term limits, would fill the vacuum. If you think the administrative state is powerful now, wait until the only people in Washington who know how the system works are the ones who never run for office.

The seen and the unseen

Henry Hazlitt's one lesson applies here with precision. Judge a policy by its effects on all groups over the long run, not just by its visible short-term benefit.

The seen benefit of term limits is new faces in Washington. That is real, and it is emotionally satisfying. But the unseen cost is power flowing to people the voters never see, never elect, and cannot remove.

Milton Friedman liked to say there is no such thing as a free lunch. Term limits have a cost, and the people paying it are the voters who think they are getting control back. A short-timer in Congress has even less reason to resist the system and more reason to use his brief power to cash in. Six years, a few favors, and then a comfortable lobbyist job. That is not reform. That is a revolving door with a shorter hallway.

Liberty is not secured by changing who holds the whip. It is secured by taking the whip away. Term limits do not shrink federal power. They merely change the roster of those who wield it.

Make public office less worth having

Let me state the argument in one sentence. Career politicians exist because government has made politics a lucrative, permanent, and powerful profession.

The solution is not to force people out on a schedule. It is to reduce what Congress is allowed to do. Do that, and the career politician becomes an endangered species.

The best way to restore the citizen legislature is to enforce the enumerated powers in Article I, Section 8, stop Congress from delegating lawmaking to unaccountable agencies, return decisions to the states and to individuals, and end the revolving door that turns public service into a path to private wealth. A Congress that does less will attract fewer people who want a career of controlling others. If the federal government were limited to the powers the Constitution actually granted it, a seat in Congress would matter far less to every interest group. Lobbying would shrink because there would be less to lobby. Staffs would shrink because there would be less to administer. The whole ecosystem of permanent Washington would lose its food supply.

That is the real fix.

Now, let me be fair to the other side. The case for term limits is easy to state. Incumbents use franking privileges, name recognition, gerrymandering, and campaign money to entrench themselves. Elections are not as clean as the Founders hoped. Fair enough.

But the answer is not to prohibit voters from re-electing a good representative. The answer is to strip the incumbency advantages and, above all, shrink the pot of power they are fighting over.

If we want term limits, there is only one constitutional way to get them: through Article V. The Supreme Court made clear in U.S. Term Limits v. Thornton that states cannot add qualifications for federal office beyond those in the Constitution. As an originalist, I accept that. But even a constitutional amendment would be a second-best fix. The first task is limits on power, not limits on time.

Liberty is secured by limiting rulers, not just rotating them

The permanent political class is a symptom. The disease is a federal government that has grown far beyond its constitutional bounds. If we only treat the symptom, the disease gets worse.

A term-limited Congress is not a smaller Congress. It is a weaker one. Weaker against the bureaucracy, weaker against the executive, and weaker against the permanent class of people who actually run the machinery. The Founders did not want a weak legislature. They wanted a limited one.

If we really want to end the career politician, we should stop paying him to mind everyone else's business. Restore the enumerated powers, return decisions to the people, and make Congress a part-time job again. That is the term limit the Founders intended, and the only one that actually works.