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Judgment / August 5, 2026 / 10 min read

Political Parties Are the Republic’s Worst Enemy — The Founders Were Right

Every election cycle we talk about presidential power, congressional gridlock, judicial activism, and the ballooning federal budget. We point fingers at bad...

Every election cycle we talk about presidential power, congressional gridlock, judicial activism, and the ballooning federal budget. We point fingers at bad leaders, bad ideas, and bad incentives, but we almost never point them at the one institution that makes all of those problems worse and none of them better. That institution is the political party. The Republican-Democrat duopoly has become so deeply embedded in American life that most people accept it the way they accept the weather. You can complain about it, but you can't do anything about it. Yet when you go back to the founding of this country, the men who designed our constitutional republic didn't treat parties as necessary evils. They treated them as an existential threat, a corrupting influence that would, if left unchecked, eat away at the structure of limited government and eventually consume it from the inside. We are living through exactly what they feared, and the first step toward repairing the damage is admitting that the party system itself is the problem, not the solution.

The Founders Saw Parties for What They Were

James Madison, the primary architect of the Constitution, devoted Federalist No. 10 to the problem of faction. He defined a faction as "a number of citizens, whether amounting to a majority or a minority of the whole, who are united and actuated by some common impulse of passion, or of interest, adverse to the rights of other citizens, or to the permanent and aggregate interests of the community." Madison understood that factions are natural - people will organize around their interests - but he did not believe the government should institutionalize them. The entire framework of the Constitution, with its separated powers and its large, diverse republic, was designed to control the effects of faction, not to hand the keys of the state over to two organized, permanent, and mutually hostile coalitions. When Madison spoke of majority factions that would "sacrifice to its ruling passion or interest both the public good and the rights of other citizens," he was describing precisely what our two-party system has become: a contest between two massive coalitions, each of which, when in power, uses the government to reward its supporters and punish its opponents, all while claiming to speak for the whole country.

George Washington was even more direct. In his Farewell Address, he warned his countrymen against "the baneful effects of the spirit of party" and called it the republic's "worst enemy." He said it "serves always to distract the public councils and enfeeble the public administration. It agitates the community with ill-founded jealousies and false alarms, kindles the animosity of one part against another, foments occasionally riot and insurrection. It opens the door to foreign influence and corruption, which finds a facilitated access to the government itself through the channels of party passions." Washington wasn't speaking about the partisan squabbles of the 1790s. He was speaking about a permanent feature of human nature that, once given an organizational home inside the government, would corrupt the whole enterprise. Read that warning again and then think about the permanent campaign, the gerrymandered districts, the billion-dollar fundraising machines, and the way foreign actors exploit our partisan media bubbles. Washington saw it all before it even had a name.

How Parties Override the Constitution

The Constitution's separation of powers was meant to fragment authority so thoroughly that no single group could dominate. Congress was split into two chambers with different constituencies and different terms. The president was given a veto. The courts were insulated from the electoral brawl. The states retained all powers not delegated to Washington. This fragmentation wasn't a mistake; it was the operating system of a free republic. Political parties override that operating system by introducing a command structure that coordinates across the branches. When one party controls the White House, the House, and the Senate, the separation of powers becomes a formality. The legislative branch stops acting as an independent check and becomes a conveyor belt for the president's agenda, because members of the same party share an electoral interest in delivering what their base demands. The party whip, the committee assignments, and the primary threats all enforce discipline in a way the Constitution never anticipated.

The judiciary suffers the same fate. Today, the party affiliation of a judge is the single most reliable predictor of how they will rule on contentious cases. Justice Antonin Scalia, an unflinching originalist, lamented this reality when he said the idea that a judge should be a Republican or a Democrat was "utterly inconsistent with the judicial oath." Yet Supreme Court confirmation hearings have become partisan slugfests precisely because everyone involved understands that a nominee's judicial philosophy is a proxy for party loyalty. The Constitution envisioned judges who would check the other branches by interpreting law, not by advancing a partisan program. The party system has turned them into another front in a permanent political war.

The Knowledge Problem: Why Parties Can't Represent You

The constitutional case against parties is devastating on its own, but Friedrich Hayek and Thomas Sowell add an economic argument that cuts even deeper. Hayek proved that no central planner can gather and process the dispersed knowledge held by millions of free individuals. The price system coordinates this knowledge through voluntary exchange, and it does so far better than any bureaucracy ever could. Political parties try to perform the same impossible feat in the realm of governance. They take an enormous range of unrelated issues - foreign policy, tax rates, health care, trade, marriage, religious liberty, education, and much more - and bundle them into a single platform. The voter who cares deeply about fiscal restraint and a strong national defense may also hold views on social issues that don't align with either party's orthodoxy. The voter who opposes foreign intervention and values civil liberties may find no natural home in a coalition that demands support for a bloated military budget. Millions of Americans are forced to swallow half a package they despise in order to support the half they care about. That is not representation. It is a cartel that forces you to buy a bundle you don't want because the alternative is handing power to the other bundle you want even less.

Sowell's contrast between the constrained and unconstrained visions sharpens the point. A limited, constitutional republic reflects the constrained vision: human nature is flawed, power corrupts, so we build fences around the state. Political parties operate within the unconstrained vision. Their purpose is to win office and then reshape society according to a comprehensive blueprint that satisfies every faction inside the coalition. A party, by its nature, is not interested in restraining government. It is interested in directing government's power toward its supporters. That means the party in power has a strong, built-in incentive to expand the very state the Constitution was designed to limit.

A Government-Protected Cartel

If the party system were genuinely responsive to voters, you would expect the kind of innovation and competition that a free market delivers. But political parties don't operate in a free market. They have constructed one of the most durable government-protected cartels in American life. Ballot access laws are the first line of defense. In state after state, the two major parties, through legislatures they control, have erected staggering petition requirements for independent and third-party candidates while giving their own nominees automatic ballot lines through publicly funded primaries. In Texas, a Republican or Democratic candidate for governor needs only a plurality in a primary to appear on the November ballot. An independent candidate must collect tens of thousands of valid signatures from registered voters, a gauntlet designed to keep out competition. Nearly every state has similar asymmetries, and they are not accidents of history. They are moats the duopoly dug to protect their monopoly.

Debate access is a second fortress. The Commission on Presidential Debates, run by former chairs of the Republican and Democratic National Committees, sets polling and ballot-access thresholds that lock out all but the two party nominees. Voters never get to see the full range of choices. The media, deeply embedded in the partisan ecosystem, treats any alternative as a spoiler rather than a legitimate option. The duopoly perpetuates itself. Milton Friedman often explained that the free market disciplines inefficiency. Any business that bundles products poorly or ignores consumer preferences eventually loses out to a competitor. Political parties face no such discipline because their position is protected by law, by custom, and by the false consensus that a two-party system is the only possible way to run a democracy.

Why Parties Always Grow the State

Here is a hard truth for anyone who believes a party can be the vehicle of limited government: the internal incentive structure of a party is fundamentally hostile to restraint. A party is a coalition of interests, and every interest in that coalition wants something from the treasury. Farmers want subsidies. Defense contractors want larger budgets. Seniors want their benefits protected. Urban voters want transit funding. The coalition only stays together if enough of those demands are met. A party that said no across the board, that insisted government should do less rather than more, would see its coalition splinter and defect to the party that is willing to deliver. That is why, even under unified Republican government, federal spending rarely goes anywhere but up. It rises on defense, on agriculture, on entitlements. The party that campaigned on fiscal conservatism discovers that cutting programs would alienate its own voters, so it doesn't. The growth of the state becomes bipartisan, because both parties, at the core, are in the business of distributing benefits to their members. They just distribute to different members.

Washington's warning about "the alternate domination of one faction over another, sharpened by the spirit of revenge, natural to party dissension" was also a prophecy about this cycle. Every party victory is an invitation to reward the winners and penalize the losers. Every party defeat is the prelude to a return engagement where the newly victorious side will do exactly the same thing. The size of the prize keeps growing because neither party has a durable incentive to shrink it. The state expands, and the parties expand with it.

What a Post-Party Republic Would Look Like

I am not proposing some utopian fantasy. I am proposing that we take the Founders at their word. A republic without permanent parties would not end political disagreement. It would mean that coalitions form around specific issues and dissolve after those issues are addressed. One session of Congress might see a coalition of free traders, fiscal conservatives, and non-interventionists pass a reduction in tariffs and a drawdown of overseas commitments. Another session might bring together a different set of members to deal with judicial reform or infrastructure. Representatives would be forced to justify their votes on the merits, not on a party whip's threat. Voters would judge candidates on fidelity to the Constitution and their character, not on the letter after their name.

This is closer to what the Constitution's original design envisioned. Members of Congress, elected by different constituencies and sworn to uphold the same document, would govern without a private, extra-constitutional structure imposing discipline from the outside. The president would have to bargain with a legislature that isn't pre-sorted into loyalists and enemies. The courts would be staffed by judges whose nominations depend on their competence and judicial philosophy, not their partisan sponsorship. The Madisonian system of checks and balances would actually operate as designed because no party whip could force coordination between the branches.

Are we going to dissolve the parties tomorrow? No. But the first step toward a healthier republic is clarity about the root of the illness. We have been told for so long that a two-party system is synonymous with self-government that we have stopped asking whether it is compatible with a constitutional republic at all. This government was designed to be a republic of laws, not men, built to protect individual liberty against the tyranny of transient majorities and organized factions. The party system is the most durable and destructive faction in American history. It subverts the separation of powers. It bundles issues in a way that makes genuine representation impossible. It locks out competition with legal barriers no legitimate enterprise could survive. It commands loyalty that should belong to the Constitution and the people, not to a private organization that exists to capture the state. The Founders didn't give us Republican and Democratic primaries. They didn't give us leadership PACs or party-line votes. They gave us a limited government designed to secure liberty. If we want to restore that vision, we have to stop outsourcing our political judgment to institutions that were never part of the original design and start asking a question that should be more natural to a free people: What does the Constitution authorize, and by what right does any private faction claim to govern my life? Washington's warning still hangs in the air, unheeded but undeniable. The spirit of party is the republic's worst enemy. The longer we pretend otherwise, the more of the Constitution we will lose.