Signius
Back to essays

Judgment / October 28, 2026 / 7 min read

The FEC’s Coordinated Communication Rule Is Quietly Chilling Political Speech

Imagine you own a small manufacturing company in Ohio. A candidate for Congress visits your local Chamber of Commerce roundtable. You ask her a pointed...

Imagine you own a small manufacturing company in Ohio. A candidate for Congress visits your local Chamber of Commerce roundtable. You ask her a pointed question about tax policy, she gives a good answer, and the two of you chat for ten minutes afterward about the cost of new equipment and the burden of compliance. Six weeks later, you decide to run a local radio ad praising her position on tax reform. You are not a campaign operative. You are not a political consultant. You are a business owner who admires a candidate.

Under the Federal Election Commission's coordinated communication rule, 11 C.F.R. § 109.21, that ad may now draw federal scrutiny. If a regulator concludes that your ten-minute conversation was a "substantial discussion," your speech may be reclassified as an illegal campaign contribution.

That is not an exaggeration. It is the logical result of a regulatory regime built on vague standards and subjective intent-reading. It is what happens when central planners try to regulate knowledge they cannot possibly possess. And it is happening in the one arena the Constitution protects most fiercely: political speech.

The First Amendment says Congress shall make no law abridging the freedom of speech. Yet the FEC has built an entire administrative architecture to decide which political speech is "independent" and which is "coordinated." The difference can mean the difference between constitutionally protected expression and a federal violation.

The Legal Architecture

Since the Supreme Court decided Buckley v. Valeo, the law has recognized a basic distinction. Campaign contributions can be limited because they carry the risk of quid pro quo corruption. But independent expenditures are different. When a citizen spends his own money to speak on his own account, without direction from a candidate, that is pure political speech. The government cannot cap it. Citizens United reaffirmed that principle.

But if a spender coordinates with a candidate, the FEC treats the expenditure as a contribution. That much is settled law. The problem is defining coordination.

The FEC's rule uses a three-prong test. First, the spender must pay for the communication. Second, the communication must satisfy a content standard. It has to clearly identify a federal candidate, republicize campaign material, or run in a pre-election window. Third, and most troubling, the communication must satisfy one of several conduct standards.

Those conduct standards include a request or suggestion from the candidate, material involvement by the campaign, a substantial discussion between the spender and campaign, the use of a common vendor, the involvement of a former employee of the campaign, or the use of campaign-prepared material.

The first two prongs are relatively objective. A payment either happened or it didn't. An ad either names a candidate or it doesn't. The third prong is where the rule collapses into guesswork.

The Knowledge Problem Comes for the First Amendment

Friedrich Hayek taught that the knowledge required for order in a complex society never exists in one central place. It is dispersed among millions of individual minds, each holding incomplete and often contradictory bits of information. That insight is usually applied to economic planning, but it applies just as powerfully to campaign finance enforcement.

The FEC is trying to determine whether a private conversation, a shared vendor, a former staffer, or an informal suggestion turned an otherwise independent ad into a coordinated contribution. The true fact of coordination lives in the private knowledge of the people involved. No regulator in Washington can reconstruct it.

So the FEC does not attempt to. It uses proxies. A common vendor, a former employee within a certain window, a vague substantial discussion. Those proxies are simultaneously underinclusive and overinclusive. They miss sophisticated coordination between people who know how to avoid the triggers. And they punish ordinary Americans who simply talked to a candidate they admired.

The substantial discussion standard is the clearest example. A candidate appears at a business roundtable. A citizen asks about tax policy. Six weeks later, that citizen wants to run an ad praising the candidate's position. Is that ad now a coordinated communication? Under the FEC's case-by-case, totality-of-the-circumstances approach, it may well draw scrutiny.

That is not fair notice. That is an invitation to self-censorship.

The Seen and the Unseen

Henry Hazlitt taught us to look for the seen and the unseen. The seen effect of the FEC's coordination rule is a handful of enforcement actions and conciliation agreements. The unseen effect is far larger.

The unseen effect is the local business owner who never runs the ad because a compliance lawyer costs more than the ad itself. It is the volunteer group that stops inviting candidates to events because a substantial discussion might later taint its mailing. It is the former campaign intern who stays out of politics for months rather than risk triggering the former-employee standard. It is the small donor who decides not to speak at all because he cannot afford to litigate his First Amendment rights.

This is not corruption prevention. This is speech suppression. Quietly, bureaucratically, and relentlessly.

Every vague standard creates a chilling effect. People who cannot know in advance whether their conduct is legal will often choose silence. That is a rational response to a lawless enforcement regime. It is also a direct injury to a free republic.

A Government of Laws, or Government of Men?

John Adams said we are a government of laws, and not of men. Justice Antonin Scalia spent his career reminding courts that the Constitution requires fair notice. A citizen should be able to know whether his conduct is lawful before he engages in it.

Substantial discussion, material involvement, and common vendor do not provide that notice. The FEC's totality-of-the-circumstances approach means that Americans often find out after the fact whether their speech was legal. That is not a government of laws. It is a government of six commissioners tasked with reading minds.

In a constitutional republic, law should guide conduct before it punishes it. The coordination rule flips that order. It asks citizens to guess at the boundaries of a legal standard that the regulators themselves cannot articulate with precision.

Penalizing Political Association

The First Amendment protects not just speech, but also the rights of association and petition. Yet the FEC's conduct standards treat a substantial discussion with a candidate as potential evidence of wrongdoing.

That is backwards. Citizens talking with candidates is not corruption. It is self-government. The Founders never imagined that Americans would need a legal firewall between themselves and their elected representatives. In fact, the whole point of a republic is that citizens petition their government and persuade their fellow citizens.

The coordination rule effectively requires sophisticated political actors to build those firewalls. Separate vendors, separate employees, separate affiliates. But firewalls are a form of self-censorship. They institutionalize the idea that too much political conversation is dangerous.

That is a strange lesson for a nation founded on the consent of the governed.

The Cartel Effect

Follow the incentives. Incumbents and well-funded organizations can hire compliance professionals. Super PACs and party committees build elaborate firewalls and maintain legal departments. Ordinary citizens cannot.

The result is an entry barrier to political speech. The rule does not stop the sophisticated from coordinating. It discourages the unsophisticated from speaking at all. It protects the political class from upstart challengers and grassroots competition.

Thomas Sowell reminds us to judge policies by their results, not their intentions. The intended result of the coordination rule is to prevent corruption. The actual result is speech suppression and incumbent protection. The people with the resources to navigate the rule are the very insiders the rule supposedly targets. The people who are silenced are ordinary Americans. That is a policy failure dressed up as reform.

A Rule That Respects the Constitution

If Congress and the FEC want a rule that is objective, predictable, and consistent with the First Amendment, they should narrow coordination to express authorization.

Coordination should mean a written or recorded agreement between the candidate, or the candidate's authorized agent, and the spender, directing or authorizing a specific communication. Absent that, the expenditure is independent. Period.

If a candidate directly transfers campaign resources to an outside group, that is coordination. If a spender uses confidential campaign strategy documents, that may be coordination. But substantial discussion, common vendor, and former employee should not be enough to convert speech into a contribution.

Would this allow some people to avoid the rules by coordinating without a written record? Possibly. But the alternative is worse. A rule that chills innocent speech to catch a small number of coordinated actors is a poor trade, especially when the speech in question is political.

Let voters see who is speaking. Let the political process sort out the rest. The FEC should not be in the business of guessing what Americans meant when they talked to a candidate.

The Bottom Line

The Constitution begins with "We the People" and soon after commands that Congress make no law abridging freedom of speech. A coordination rule built on subjective standards inverts that structure. It gives unelected bureaucrats the power to police private conversations between citizens and their candidates.

Hayek saw the central planner's fatal flaw. The knowledge required to run a complex system does not exist in one place. The FEC's coordination rule proves the point. The knowledge required to decide what is coordinated lives in millions of private minds. Regulators cannot know it. So they substitute vague proxies and punish innocent speech.

It is time to restore a simple rule. If there is no express written authorization, there is no coordination. Let Americans speak freely, talk to their candidates, and let the voters decide the rest.

That is what a free republic looks like. And it is worth defending.