Judgment / August 10, 2026 / 10 min read
The Unitary Executive Is Your Last Defense Against Unaccountable Government
Most Americans hear "unitary executive theory" and immediately picture some exotic constitutional architecture designed to hand the president the powers of...
Most Americans hear "unitary executive theory" and immediately picture some exotic constitutional architecture designed to hand the president the powers of a king. For decades, progressive voices have warned that it's a right-wing power grab meant to let the White House steamroll Congress and the courts. They have it exactly backward. The unitary executive is not a threat to your liberty - it is a safeguard built into the Constitution to protect you from something far more menacing, unaccountable, and genuinely hostile to republican government: the modern administrative state.
Here is the angle you almost never hear. The unitary executive is not about swelling presidential authority. It is about shrinking the diffuse, untouchable bureaucratic power that has quietly subverted the constitutional order, shredded the separation of powers, and replaced the rule of law with the rule of insulated experts. Seen through the lens of classical liberalism - the lens of Alexander Hamilton, Antonin Scalia, Friedrich Hayek, and Henry Hazlitt - the unitary executive solves a governance problem so fundamental that its neglect explains much of what frustrates ordinary Americans about Washington. Who actually writes the rules that govern your life, and how in the world do you fire them?
What the Constitution Actually Says
Let's begin where every serious constitutional question must begin: with the text. Article II, Section 1 is breathtakingly simple. "The executive Power shall be vested in a President of the United States of America." Not a council. Not a commission. Not a sprawling constellation of so-called independent agencies. One president. One executive. The Framers debated this exact question at length and arrived at a clear, deliberate conclusion: energy, responsibility, and accountability demand a single hand at the helm.
Alexander Hamilton laid out the argument with characteristic force in Federalist No. 70. "Energy in the Executive is a leading character in the definition of good government," he wrote. "A feeble Executive implies a feeble execution of the government. A feeble execution is but another phrase for a bad execution; and a government ill executed, whatever it may be in theory, must be, in practice, a bad government." Hamilton did not stop there. He confronted the obvious objection head-on: wouldn't a single executive become a tyrant? His answer is one of the most underappreciated insights in American political thought. The unitary executive is actually more easily checked because he is one person. "The unity is conducive to responsibility," Hamilton explained. The president can be impeached, tried, and removed from office. "Whereas a council, from the difficulty of fixing upon the guilty persons, is less responsible."
That is the beating heart of the unitary executive theory. When power rests in a single individual who can be watched, judged, and thrown out by the people or their representatives, liberty is guarded. When power is scattered across a thousand administrators who never face an election and cannot be fired, liberty gets smothered beneath layers of anonymity. Justice Antonin Scalia put it memorably in his dissent in Morrison v. Olson, the 1988 case that upheld an independent counsel statute insulating a prosecutor from presidential removal. "To take another person's life, to deprive him of his liberty, to take his property - these are the most awesome powers of government," Scalia wrote. "And whoever exercises them must be an officer of the United States, accountable to the President, who in turn is accountable to the people." That is the unitary executive in a single sentence: all executive power must flow through a chain of command that ends at the ballot box. Anything else is a constitutional sleight-of-hand that transfers your sovereignty to a class of people you never see and can never remove.
The Unseen Cost of Independent Agencies
Here is where the cool-eyed economic reasoning of Henry Hazlitt becomes indispensable. In Economics in One Lesson, Hazlitt taught us to look past the immediate, visible effects of a policy and trace the long-run, unseen consequences rippling through the whole system. The progressive movement of the early twentieth century - the New Deal, the Great Society - sold the country a seductive bargain: create independent regulatory agencies. The visible benefit was straightforward. Take the politics out of complicated fields like banking, communications, and environmental protection. Staff commissions with nonpartisan experts who will make intelligent, scientifically sound decisions for the public good. Who could possibly object to neutral expertise?
The unseen cost has been a separation-of-powers catastrophe. These agencies - the Securities and Exchange Commission, the Federal Communications Commission, the Federal Trade Commission, the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, the National Labor Relations Board, and scores more - were deliberately placed outside the president's removal power. Their members serve fixed terms, often staggered, and can be dismissed only for cause. The architects of this system understood exactly what they were constructing: a fourth branch of government that would wield legislative power by writing rules with the force of law, executive power by investigating and prosecuting violations, and judicial power by adjudicating cases in their own administrative courts, all while answering to none of the branches the Constitution actually establishes.
James Madison saw this coming. In Federalist No. 47 he warned, "The accumulation of all powers, legislative, executive, and judiciary, in the same hands, whether of one, a few, or many, and whether hereditary, self-appointed, or elective, may justly be pronounced the very definition of tyranny." Today an EPA administrator can write a regulation that destroys a farmer's business, bring an enforcement action against him, and then oversee the administrative tribunal that decides his fate - with no meaningful input from Congress, the courts, or the chief executive who is supposed, under the Constitution, to execute the law. That farmer cannot vote the administrator out of office. He cannot ask his congressman to cut her funding, because Congress long ago surrendered meaningful control over appropriations. He cannot rely on the president to fire her, because the Supreme Court has only recently - and only partially - reasserted that removal power.
That is the precise tyrannical outcome the unitary executive theory exists to prevent. Every time a court or a Congress shields a bureaucrat from presidential removal, it does not balance power. It creates a pocket of unaccountable, concentrated authority that the Founders would have immediately recognized as an assault on republican government. The unitary executive is the constitutional crowbar that pries those pockets open and subjects them to democratic sunlight.
Hayek's Knowledge Problem Arrives in Washington
Now we can bring Friedrich Hayek's classical liberal insight to bear with devastating effect on the whole independent-agency project. Hayek's great contribution was the knowledge problem: no central planner, however brilliant, can possibly gather all the dispersed, local, time-sensitive knowledge that millions of free individuals use to coordinate their actions in a market economy. The exact same logic applies to government rulemaking.
When Congress creates an independent agency and delegates to it vague authority to regulate "the public interest" or impose rules that are "fair and reasonable," it has washed its hands of the lawmaking function. The agency then fills that void with thousands of pages of regulations drafted by unelected economists and lawyers operating from a single building in Washington. This is central planning applied to the nation's productive life, and it suffers from the identical fatal flaw Hayek identified. The planners cannot possibly know the specific circumstances, trade-offs, and volatile realities of every business and community across a continent. They guess. They impose uniform templates. And they generate enormous unintended consequences that crush innovation, stifle entrepreneurship, and trap ordinary people in compliance nightmares.
Think about the Clean Water Act. Congress wrote broad goals, and for decades the EPA and the Army Corps of Engineers redefined "waters of the United States" through shifting agency guidance rather than law. A farmer who wants to plow a depression that holds water after a heavy rain must hire consultants and lawyers to determine whether his field has suddenly fallen under federal jurisdiction. No elected official ever voted for that rule. No president can be held directly responsible for it, because the rule originates with career staff who operate with a degree of independence that would have appalled the Framers. The unitary executive would force that chain of command straight to the top, making the president answer for every such regulatory excess - and giving the voter a clear target at election time.
Accountability, Hayek would have said, is what keeps the rule of law from degenerating into the rule of men. When the president can direct and remove subordinates, he cannot hide behind a fog of agency process. If execution is clumsy, overreaching, or unjust, his fingerprints are on it. He answers for it at the ballot box. That accountability is what keeps government narrow and predictable.
The Monarchy Bogeyman
The objection arrives on cue, so let me state it fairly and then dismantle it. If the president can fire any executive officer, does that not make him a monarch? Does the unitary executive not destroy the checks and balances that prevent tyranny?
Nonsense. The unitary executive is not an unlimited executive. The president remains hemmed in by the full array of constitutional checks that the Framers designed. Congress writes the laws and holds the purse strings. The Senate confirms key officers, providing a second democratic filter. The courts exercise judicial review to ensure that executive actions comply with statute and the Constitution. The president himself remains subject to impeachment and removal by Congress. And ultimately, every four years, the people can send him packing. The unitary executive theory simply insists that when the law is executed, one person at the top bears the responsibility and the blame. That is not a king. That is a CEO operating within a framework of shareholder oversight - the citizens - and a board of directors - Congress and the courts - that can fire him or cut his budget.
The alternative is not a more balanced government. It is a government where nobody can be held accountable, so everybody does as they please. An SEC commissioner serving a fixed five-year term, removable only for inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance in office, knows perfectly well that short of outright criminality, he will not lose his job. He can write rules that cost an industry billions, kill thousands of jobs, and face zero political consequence. That is not accountability. That is insulation. And insulation from the people is the very definition of aristocratic or oligarchic rule. If you are looking for a king, you will find him in the anonymous panels of the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, not in the Oval Office.
A Restoration Worth Defending
The good news is that a constrained, constitutionalist Supreme Court has begun to dismantle these fortifications against the unitary executive. In Seila Law v. CFPB (2020), the Court struck down the for-cause removal protection for the director of the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, holding that an agency headed by a single individual wielding substantial executive power must be removable at will by the president. Collins v. Yellen (2021) extended that reasoning to the Federal Housing Finance Agency. And the death of Chevron deference in Loper Bright Enterprises (2024) means courts will no longer automatically rubber-stamp agency interpretations of ambiguous statutes - a massive step toward forcing Congress to actually write clear laws and forcing the executive to simply execute them.
These decisions are not victories for presidential power in the abstract. They are victories for the Constitution's design: a president who can direct the executive branch, a Congress that must do its job, and courts that police the boundaries. They are victories for you, the citizen who wants to know whom to hold responsible when government overreaches.
Whom Do You Fire?
That is the human stake in all of this. The next time a federal rule threatens your business, your farm, your medical practice, or your church, ask yourself one question: whom do I hold responsible? Under the administrative state, you hold nobody. You hire a lawyer, you lose years and a fortune navigating an opaque process, and in the end a mid-level bureaucrat you have never met issues a final order that cannot be effectively appealed. Under the unitary executive faithfully applied, the chain of command runs straight to the president. That means you have a political target. You vote. You organize. You throw the rascal out, and a new president fires the agency heads who wrote the rule and installs ones who will respect your liberty.
That is the difference between a republic and a technocratic oligarchy. The unitary executive is not a threat to your freedom. It is the last structural defense of democratic accountability in a government that has spent a century building escape hatches from the voters. Defend it. Insist on it. Because without it, the experts will run your life, and you will never be able to tell them to stop.